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Legislative proposals to amend the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (the "OSH Act") have been introduced in
Congress each of the last six years, but with no success. The OSH Act
is one of the most controversial pieces of legislation ever enacted by
Congress not only because of the sharply conflicting political and
economic interests at stake, but also because of disagreement as to
the precise method for administering and enforcing the legislation.
Efforts at amending the OSH Act have also resulted in vigorous
disagreement between labor and industry. Despite the controversy,
some future amendment is likely because a large number of
workplace illnesses and injuries are experienced every year by
American workers.
Third party audits of American businesses and a federal
statutory privilege for third party audits are among the major changes
to the existing legislative program proposed in Congress. These
changes represent a remedy that is aimed at attacking the problem of
occupational safety and health injury in small businesses. Generally,
small businesses have not seen a reduction in occupational injury and
illness rates. The lack of a reduction in those rates can be viewed as a
public health and policy failure, particularly in light of the fact that
small businesses are the fastest growing sector in the U.S. economy.
To address this failure, some have suggested that Congress
increase the number of federal inspectors or the amount of penalties
for workplace violations. However, these suggestions do not
recognize the fundamental change that has occurred with respect to
the role of the federal government in our society. Specifically, growth
in the small business sector now makes it less likely that the limited
number of government inspectors will perform a workplace
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inspection.
The third party audit method is consistent with the current
paradigm of the federal government's role in workplace inspection
because third party audits would rely on the private sector, not the
federal government, for workplace inspections. In addition, the
federal statutory privilege for third party audits encourages
businesses to conduct inspections in order to identify potential
hazards.
In theory, existing federal government auditing policies
encourage companies to inspect their workplaces. However, because
no federal statute provides for a privilege for this information, the
federal government can discover the information and use it as the
basis for citations, fines, or other legal action.
Third party audits are considered a viable concept for stand-
alone legislation and represent a major change to the existing OSH
Act. This article maintains that third party audits, accompanied by a
federal statutory privilege for third party audits, are necessary if the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration's ("OSHA") goal of
protecting American workers from occupational injury and illness is
to be achieved. Part I discusses the need for reform of the OSH Act
and summarizes the current Senate version of OSHA reform. Part II
provides background information on occupational safety and health
audits, provides guidelines for the conduct of audits, and identifies the
present federal government policies for conducting audits. In
addition, Part II delineates the legal methods or common law
privileges that protect audit information from discovery. This section
also discusses a union's right to health and safety information and
examines how this ostensible conflict could be resolved with a federal
statutory privilege for audit information. Finally, Part III explores
the federal statutory privilege for third party audit information as
formulated by the current Senate version of OSHA reform.
I. OSHA REFORM
A. Legislative Efforts for OSHA Reform in the 1990s
1. General Reform Efforts
April 1996 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the OSH Act's
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enforcement.' Reform legislation has been introduced in every
session of Congress since OSHA's twentieth anniversary in 1991 and
legislation is currently pending in Congress. 2 At least two OSHA
reform bills have unsuccessfully been introduced each year since
1993. The reform legislation has proposed major philosophic and
structural changes to the existing legislative program. These changes
include exempting certain operations from routine inspections,
codifying several employer defenses, and reducing or eliminating
fines under certain circumstances. Similar to the OSH Act of 1970,
the reform legislation has been the subject of vigorous disagreement
between labor and industry. This paper will focus on third party
audits because OSHA's goal of protecting American workers from
occupational injury and illness is simply not met without effective
enforcement. The only hope for achieving OSHA's goal is an
effective inspection mechanism like the third party audit.
2. The Third Party Audit Provisions of S. 1237
The major focus of the current Senate version of OSHA reform
has been third party audits.3 Vice President Gore advocated the
concept of third party audits in his Reinventing Government report.4
Third party audits rely on private inspection companies or non-
management employees to ensure that all workplaces would be
regularly inspected.5 The goal of third party audits is for every
employer to have a competent health and safety professional assess
their facilities so that the employer can identify and correct health
and safety standards.6 A third party audit consultation, as envisioned
by the current Senate version of OSHA reform, would consist of a
qualified third party auditor evaluating a workplace to determine
compliance within the requirements of the OSH Act.7 No later than
ten business days after an auditor provides a consultation service, the
auditor must provide the employer with a written report that
identifies any occupational safety and health violations.8 The written
1. See OSHA Hits Quarter-Century Mark, West's Legal News, May 6, 1996, available in
1996 WL 260658.
2. See generally H.R. 2579, 105th Cong. (1997); See S. 1237, 105th Cong. (1997).
3. See Deborah Williams, The SAFE Act: The Right Combination for OSHA Reform?,
THE SYNERGIST, February 15, 1998, at 23, 24.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See S. 1237 § 5(a)(1).
7. See id.
8. See id. § 5(d)(2).
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report must also contain recommendations that identify the corrective
measures that the employer needs to carry out in order to be in
compliance with the OSH Act.9 No later than thirty days after
receiving the written report, the auditor must also re-inspect the
employer's workplace to verify that any hazards have been abated.'0
If the corrective measures have been completed, the auditor would
then provide the employer with a declaration of compliance."
The current Senate version of OSHA reform also creates a
federal statutory privilege for the third party audits. 2 Any records
relating to a third party audit would not be admissible in a court of
law or administrative proceeding except to show fraud or malfeasance
of a certified auditor. 3
Although it is not explicitly stated in the current Senate version
of OSH Act reform, OSHA would presumably be responsible for
designing model health and safety programs that a third party auditor
would use to assess specific workplaces. However, an independent,
nonpartisan advisory committee would be charged with making
recommendations to the Secretary of Labor with respect to the third
party audits.14 Additionally, OSHA would approve or certify third
party auditors as competent based on specific criteria. 5
Individuals qualified to become certified as third party auditors
would be required to be either: (1) licensed by a state authority as a
physician, industrial hygienist, professional engineer, safety engineer,
safety professional, or occupational nurse; (2) an individual who had
been a state or federal occupational safety and health inspector for a
period greater than five years; or (3) an individual certified in an
occupational health or safety field by an organization whose
certification program had been accredited by a nationally recognized
private accreditation organization or by the Secretary of Labor. 16 In
addition, the Secretary of Labor would have the authority to extend
eligibility as a third party auditor to "other individuals determined to
be qualified by the Secretary.' 7 If it was determined that the auditor
9. See id.
10. See id. § 5(d)(3).
11. See id.
12. See id. § 5(e).
13. See id § 5(f)(2).
14. See id. § 4.
15. See id. § 5(a)(2)(A)-(D).
16. See id.
17. Id. § 5(a)(2)(D).
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had failed to meet the requirements of the accreditation program, the
Secretary would be empowered to revoke the auditor's privilege to
participate in the third party audit program.18
To promote the use of third party audits, a two-year exemption
from regular inspections has been proposed.19 Specifically, employers
who utilized the services of certified safety and health professionals
under the third party audit program would be exempt for a period of
two years from any civil penalty prescribed under the OSH Act.20
This exemption would not apply if the employer had not made a good
faith effort to remain in compliance as prescribed by the declaration
of compliance, or if there had been a fundamental change in the
hazards at the workplace.21 Additionally, under the current Senate
version of OSHA reform there is no benefit to the employer unless
the company pays for the review and then implements the
recommended corrective measures.22 Even though comprehensive
OSHA reform legislation faces a difficult time and a remote chance
of passage, the third party audit concept is viewed as a viable concept
for stand-alone legislation.23
B. The Need for OSHA Reform
One of the main criticisms of OSHA has been its perceived
failure to reduce occupational safety and health injury and illness in
small businesses, one of the fastest growing sectors in the United
States. Another seemingly intractable problem faced by OSHA is the
small probability that any given workplace will be subject to an
OSHA inspection.
In the United States, while the small business sector continues to
grow, the actual size of each small business is getting smaller.24 In
1992, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health found
that forty percent of the U.S. workforce, or over ninety percent of the
actual physical work sites in the United States are comprised of
18. See id. § 5(c)(1)(A)-(B).
19. See id. § 5(f)(1).
20. See id.
21. See id. § 5(f)(2)(A).
22. See id. § 5(f)(1).
23. See Letter from American Industrial Hygiene Association to its members, Happenings
from the Hill 2 (Feb. 2, 1998) (on file with the author).
24. See Small Business Regulatory Assistance Act of 1997: Hearings on H.R. 96 Before the
Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform and Paperwork Reduction of the House Committee on Small
Business, 105th Cong. 3 (1997) (statement of D. Jeff Burton, President, American Industrial
Hygiene Association).
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businesses of fifty or fewer employees.25 These businesses have no
occupational health and safety expertise on staff, are not regularly
inspected by OSHA, and have little information about occupational
health and safety.
2 6
Under Section 7(c)(1) of the OSH Act, OSHA has taken steps to
provide small business assistance efforts. Under this section, federal
matching funds are provided to states for on-site consultation. The
on-site consultation program involves evaluating the physical hazards,
the work methods, employee practices, and current safety and health
practices in the workplace. A comprehensive program for
compliance is developed on the basis of the evaluation. However, it is
difficult for a business entity to receive an OSHA consultation service
because of the length of time required before an OSHA consultant
can respond to the request.27 Additionally, many employers are not
comfortable calling OSHA for assistance because of their concern
about being placed on an inspection list.28
There are more than six million workplaces that are under the
jurisdiction of OSHA and there are approximately 2,400 compliance
officers in the federal and state programs. Based on these numbers, it
is unlikely for any workplace to be inspected on average more than
once every fifty to eighty years.2 9 Therefore, other strategies such as
third party audits have been recommended.
II. OSHA AUDITS
A. The Audit Concept
1. General Ideas
Environmental auditing emerged in the late 1970s and early
1980s as a separate and distinct management compliance tool.30 This
tool was stimulated principally by the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (the "SEC") actions against three large industrial
companies. 31 The SEC believed that each company was understating
25. See id. at 3-4.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 3.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See LAWRENCE B. CAHILL, ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS, 1-9 to 1-12 (6th ed. 1989).
31. See id. at 1-11.
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its liabilities in its annual report to shareholders. 32 As a result, the
SEC required each of the companies to undertake a corporate-wide
audit to determine accurately the extent of environmental liabilities
they faced.33
The SEC's actions were followed closely by a burgeoning of
federal environmental, safety, and health regulations.34  Many
companies developed audit programs to respond better to these
regulations because of their comprehensiveness, complexity, and the
potential cost of noncompliance.35 Because many businesses think
that good management and business requires complying with federal
regulations, auditing has become an acknowledged part of
professional business planning.3 6
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of workplace occupational health
and safety programs is not measured by an audit. This difference
represents an important distinction because a program evaluation
actually requires measuring performance. An audit merely provides
an indication of activity in a given area. An audit:
is a process by which persons with relevant health and safety
expertise external or internal to the organizations determine the
presence or absence of [occupational safety and health program
elements] and compare them to those currently required by law, or
those established by professional groups or by the [company] itself.
An audit is not a program evaluation because it does not focus on
the degree to which the program's elements attain stated objectives,
i.e. prevention of injury or illness, the presence of [a program]
element in an audit implies that it is capable of moving the
[company] towards a preventive goal [or regulatory requirement],
but this is an assumption.37
Critics may argue that, because audits do not assess the
effectiveness of an employer's occupational health and safety
program, audits should not replace OSHA compliance inspections.
Nevertheless, auditing will continue to be an important tool to assess
an employer's occupational safety and health programs and, as
discussed below, efforts are underway to improve audits through the





36. See Lynn L. Bergeson, Compliance Audits Are the Key to Staying Out of Court, the
Writing Is on the Wall, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1992, at 17,17.
37. Morton Corn & Peter S.J. Lees, The Industrial Hygiene Audit: Purposes and
Implementation, 44 AM. IND. HYGIENE ASS'N. J. 135, 136 (1983).
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2. Auditing Guidelines
Currently, there is no standard auditing format, nor are there
specific regulatory requirements that an audit must meet. However,
OSHA has encouraged employers to prevent employee accidents and
illnesses through voluntary self-audits. 38 Although no comprehensive
OSHA standard for general industry employers to conduct audits
exists, there are many audit requirements in certain types of
industries.39 For example, employers in the construction industry are
subject to a comprehensive audit requirement.4n
The Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") has issued
its own audit policy and statement defining auditing.41 The EPA
defines auditing as a "systematic, documented, periodic and objective
review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices
related to meeting environmental requirements. '42  The EPA
Auditing Policy also suggests seven elements for "an effective
environmental auditing system. ' 43  Several North American groups
have also established guidelines for conducting environmental, health
and safety audits. For example, the American Industrial Hygiene
Association (the "AIHA") has issued a publication that addresses
auditing occupational health programs. 44  The Environmental
Auditing Roundtable (the "EAR"), another professional
organization, finalized a set of environmental auditing guidelines in
1993. 41 Many of these guidelines provide criteria for conducting the
audit itself and include standards for auditor proficiency, objectives,
plans and procedures, field work, quality control, documentation and
clear report writing.
The EPA definition of an audit and the current existing
guidelines will likely provide a starting point for future dialogue and
38. See Stephen C. Yohay, OSHA Compels Disclosure of Safety and Health Audits: Smart
Enforcement or Misguided Policy?, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 663,663 (1993).
39. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.146 (1997) (confined space standard); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(c)
(1997) (lockout/tagout standard); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 (1997) (process safety management
standard); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (1997) (hazardous waste standard).
40. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. 1926.20(b) (1997) (requiring frequent and regular inspections of job
sites by competent persons to assure compliance with the OSHA construction standards).
41. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004 (1986).
42. Id. at 25,006.
43. Id. at 25,009.
44. See generally AMERICAN INDUS. HYGIENE ASS'N MANAGEMENT COMM., INDUSTRIAL
HYGIENE AUDITING A MANUAL FOR PRACTICE (1994) [hereinafter AIHA Auditing Manual].
45. See generally Environmental Auditing Standards Update, BUSINESS & ENVIRONMENT
CUTTER INFORMATION CORPORATION, July 1, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2736153.
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debate on what a third party audit under OSHA reform should entail.
Additionally, the AIHA has established guidelines for occupational
safety and health management systems,46 and OSHA has proposed a
draft for an occupational safety and health program standard. 47 These
guidelines are likely to be assessed during the discussion on what a
third party audit should entail.
B. Present Federal Audit Policies
As mentioned above, both the EPA and OSHA have announced
policies that encourage companies to voluntarily perform compliance
audits.48 Additionally, both agencies have taken the position that they
have the authority to compel disclosure of audit information. OSHA
has also taken the position that the information in the audit might be
used to determine if an OSHA violation had occurred and to
determine both the severity of the violation and the penalty.
49
OSHA's ability to compel disclosure of audit information has been
upheld in at least one federal court.50
OSHA does have other means to gain access to audit
information. First, workers or union representatives in unionized
workplaces can and do provide information to OSHA concerning
OSHA violations.51 Also, OSHA has authority to gather other
documents from the employer, to interview employees and other
witnesses, and to take sworn statements as part of an investigation.
52
OSHA's statement supporting conducting audits was announced
in a July 1991 letter from the Secretary of Labor to the chief executive
officers of the Fortune 500 companies.53 This letter is not as detailed
as the EPA's policy. More importantly, OSHA did not announce in
the July 1991 letter that it might seek to compel discovery of audit
information during inspections.5 4  Alternatively, the EPA did
46. See generally AMERICAN INDUS. HYGIENE ASS'N, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: AN AIHA GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (1996).
47. See Safety and Health Programs (For General Industry and Shipyards), 63 Fed. Reg.
22,260 (1998) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915) (proposed April 27, 1998).
48. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 41; see also AIHA Auditing
Manual, supra note 44.
49. See AIHA Auditing Manual, supra note 44, at 663.
50. See id. at 664-65 (citing Martin v. Hammermill Paper Div. of Int'l Paper Co., 796 F.
Supp. 1474 (S.D. Ala. 1992)).
51. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1600.
52. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1599.
53. See AIHA Auditing Manual, supra note 44, at 663.
54. See id.
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announce in the text of its policy statement that it might compel
disclosure of audit information. The key aspect of both agencies'
auditing policies follows.
First, as already mentioned, both agencies encourage companies
to audit their environmental, safety, and health programs for
compliance. The EPA encourages the use of environmental auditing
to "help ensure the adequacy of internal systems to achieve, maintain
and monitor compliance."55  OSHA's July 1991 policy letter
encouraged auditing "with as much management support, precision,
and care as critical financial audits." 56
Second, "as a matter of policy, [the] EPA [does] not routinely
request environmental audit reports."57 Yet, the EPA's authority to
obtain audit information depends on a "case-by-case basis where the
Agency determines [that the information] is needed to accomplish
[its] statutory mission, or where the Government deems [the
information] to be material to a criminal investigation. 5 8 OSHA has
not provided a policy statement on this issue but is seeking some form
of a compromise. 9 OSHA's Field Inspection Reference Manual (the
"FIRM"), the manual that provides guidance to OSHA compliance
officers that conduct inspections, does not direct the compliance
officer to request audit information on a routine basis.6° However,
the FIRM leaves it to the compliance officer's discretion whether to
request such information.
The EPA has stated that it would not change its enforcement
program in response to the existence of an environmental auditing
program at a regulated facility.61 Specifically, the EPA stated that it
would not "promise to forgo inspections, reduce enforcement
responses, or offer other such incentives in exchange for
implementation of environmental auditing or other sound
environmental management practices. '62 There is no indication or
report that OSHA has a contrary policy even though no written
55. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 41, at 25,006.
56. AIHA Auditing Manual, supra note 44, at 663.
57. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 41, at 25,007 (emphasis in
original).
58. Id.
59. See Cynthia Omberg, OSHA Seeking Compromise on Employer, Agency Use of Safety
Audit Data, Panel Told, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, Aug. 5, 1998, at 263.
60. See OSHA Field Inspection Reference Manual CPL 2.103 (visited Apr. 8, 1999)
<http://www.osha-slc.gov/Firm-oshatocbysect.html>.
61. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 41, at 25,007.
62. Id.
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document from OSHA addresses this issue. More recently, OSHA
has indicated that lower penalties would be considered for an
employer that voluntarily conducts an audit and implements a
reasonable plan to correct the identified deficiencies.63
The EPA did recognize in its written policy the inhibiting effect
that not providing protection from enforcement actions was likely to
have on companies performing a compliance audit. From a public
policy and public health viewpoint, both agencies' decision to use
their authority to compel disclosure of audit information is unwise
because of the inhibiting effect that such a policy has on voluntary
audits. In today's environment of smaller government and shrinking
federal budgets, perhaps the only realistic means of meeting the OSH
Act's purpose of protecting the nation's workers is to encourage
companies to look at and review their workplace. OSHA's policy of
not providing protection for voluntary auditing works against
OSHA's efforts to prevent injury and disease. For example, some
employers likely do not engage in voluntary auditing because of the
potential risks of receiving increased penalties after voluntary
disclosure. Alternatively, other employers might not document their
auditing efforts and thereby reduce the possibility of taking corrective
measures. In addition, some employees might not be as forthright
during an audit interview knowing that the information they provide
could support an OSHA citation against their employer. Finally, the
effectiveness of an audit may decrease if an employer carefully words
its audits so as to avoid the risks associated with the audit.
The overriding public policy question is whether the risk of not
having employers conduct voluntary audits is worth the benefits of
gaining access to the information contained in audits. As mentioned
earlier, because of OSHA's limited resources, the number of
inspections and the likelihood of an employer being inspected is
small. As a result, the number of voluntary audits that OSHA will
actually obtain is also small. In contrast, there are a large number of
employers who are likely to not conduct audits because of the
aforementioned risks. This result has a negative impact on the
nation's workforce because employers are not assessing their
workplaces for occupational health and safety hazards and thereby
preventing injury and illness. These arguments strongly suggest that
63. See generally Joseph Dear, Voluntary Safety and Health Audits under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (visited Sept. 18, 1998) <http://www.osha-slc.gov/OshDoc?Interp-data/
119960911.html>.
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it is doubtful that OSHA or the public will benefit from compelled
disclosure of audit information. Rather, there is public harm in the
form of injury and illness in those workplaces that OSHA will never
inspect and an employer will not audit.
C. Proposed OSHA Third Party Audit Program
The major provisions of the current Senate version of OSHA
reform were presented earlier in Part II.A.2 of this article. Critics
have raised several arguments against third party audits. These
arguments have tended to focus on the federal statutory privilege for
third party audits. Critics complain that the audit results would be
secret because OSHA could not review them during an inspection. If
OSHA were able to review audit results during an inspection, the
information could serve as a basis for a more serious citation and
higher civil penalty.
Additionally, critics complain that there is no provision that
grants workers or unions access to the audits. However, as discussed
later, if a union represents employees, employer information about
workplace safety and health must be disclosed upon request to the
union. This obligation arises in connection with the employer's duty
to bargain in good faith about safety and health issues.64 Moreover, a
long-standing tenet of occupational safety and health professionals
has been that in order to protect oneself from injury or illness, the
individual employee needs information about workplace hazards.
Critics would argue that audit results might contain information
useful to the employee for preventive purposes. The fallacy of this
argument is demonstrated by the fact that employers will not keep
relevant audit information from their employees because various
OSHA standards require an employer to inform and train workers
about workplace hazards. 65
64. See NLRB v. American Nat'l Can Co., Foster-Forbes Glass Div., 924 F.2d 518, 524 (4th
Cir. 1991) (granting union access to heat measurements at company's glass manufacturing
plant).
65. See, e.g., OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R.§ 1910.1200 (1998).
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D. Issues Related to Third Party Audits
1. The Application of Common Law Privileges
a. Background
The rules of privilege serve a purpose opposite to the rules
controlling discovery. The rules controlling discovery are designed
primarily to promote the presentation of objective and reliable
evidence at trial. 66 In contrast, the rules of privilege are inhibitive
rules. In other words, they are meant to benefit the public good by
encouraging the free flow of information within relationships whose
utility is dependent upon frank communication.6 When determining
whether communication should be privileged, courts have historically
balanced the public's interest in the need for disclosure of the
information at trial against the need to keep communications within
certain relationships private.
68
This balancing test is embodied in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the body of rules that federal courts must look to for
guidance when developing and applying discovery privileges in civil
proceedings.69 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly make
the Federal Rules of Evidence the appropriate source to find
guidance on the application of privileged communications. 70 Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 governs the development of privileges in
federal courts and empowers the courts to apply the common law
with respect to privileges.7 Because the public's interest is a valid
justification for applying a privilege at common law, the public's
interest is a relevant factor when determining the applicability and
66. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 268-69 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
67. See id. at 270.
68. See Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1983).
69. See id.
70. See FED. R. EvID. 1101(c) ("The rule with respect to privileges applies at all stages of
all actions, cases, and proceedings."); see also Note, supra note 68, at 1084.
71. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in
civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
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scope of privileges .7  Thus, Rule 501 "embodies a congressional
intent that [the] privilege doctrine be fluid rather than static. '73
However, courts have been hesitant to create new privileges
despite the congressional intent that the privilege doctrine be fluid
rather than static.74 Courts may be hesitant to create new privileges
because of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bias in favor of
discovery. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) allows discovery
of all unprivileged information relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action.75 Additionally, the information sought need
not be admissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 76  The
burden imposed by the "reasonably calculated" standard in Rule
26(b)(1) is so low that some have argued there is no limit on
discovery.77 In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court did
not follow the bias in favor of discovery and expanded the scope of
the attorney-client privilege to include not only corporate officers, but
also to include employees. 78 In Upjohn, the Supreme Court held that
certain communications between Upjohn employees and Upjohn's
counsel was privileged. 79  That communication comprised of
information relating to Upjohn's internal investigation of suspected
illegal payments to foreign government officials. 0  The Court
reasoned that the communications were consistent with the public
policy underlying the attorney-client privilege, namely to encourage
open and frank communication between attorneys and their clients.
One of the primary purposes of the OSH Act is to reduce
occupational injury and illness." If third party auditing will
72. See Note, supra note 68, at 1084-85 & n.9.
73. Id. at 1084.
74. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 806 (1984) (refusing to create a
new common law accountant-client privilege).
75. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (requiring parties to provide copies or descriptions of
the type and location of all information, documents, data or tangible things in control of the
party that are relevant to the disputed facts alleged without waiting for a discovery request).
76. See id. 26(b)(1).
77. See generally David R. DeMuro, Colorado's Approach To Discovery and Pretrial
Reform in Civil Cases, 16 REV. LITIG. 271 (1997); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions
Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691
(1997)
78. 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (application of privilege is on a case-by-case basis and should
not be so narrow as to frustrate the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the
communication of relevant information).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 395.
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1) (1984).
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encourage compliance with OSHA's standards and further assist in
the identification of occupational hazards, then the third party audit
advances a compelling public interest. The countervailing interest in
the disclosure of facts at trial is not as weighty because information
contained in an audit could be obtained through other means.
Congress should, therefore, encourage auditing by removing the
possible liability that is associated with discovery and providing for a
federal statutory privilege to audit information.
The remainder of this section will deal with the attorney-client
privilege, the work product doctrine, and the self-evaluative privilege.
In addition, this section will also examine the various issues that may
arise when a company asserts one of the above privileges. Absent a
federal statutory privilege for audit information (such as the one
found in the current Senate amendment to the OSH Act), these are
the privileges that a company would have to rely on in order to
protect voluntary audit information from disclosure.
b. Attorney-Client Privilege for Third Party Audits
The attorney-client privilege is designed to protect
communications between a lawyer and his or her client from
disclosure under certain circumstances. The purpose of the attorney-
client privilege "is to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice." 2  The attorney-client privilege "rests on the need for the
advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons
for seeking representation [if the] professional mission [is to be]
carried out. 83 In addition to the Supreme Court, the legal profession
has also recognized how essential the attorney-client privilege is to
our legal system.84
The attorney-client privilege only applies if: (1) the person
82. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389.
83. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (apart from confidential
communications, a witness spouse alone has the privilege to refuse to testify adversely and may
be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying).
84. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 reads in part:
A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order
for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system .... [To] hold inviolate the
confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts
essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek
early legal assistance.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1995).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
claiming the privilege is, or sought to become, a client; (2) the person
receiving the communication is (a) a member of the bar, or his
subordinate, and (b) acting as an attorney in connection with the
communication; (3) the communication is related to a fact of which
the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence
of strangers (c) for the primary purpose of securing either (i) legal
advice, (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding;
(4) the communication is not made for the purpose of committing a
crime or tort; and (5) the privilege is (a) claimed and (b) not waived
by the client. 5 Because no showing of need can compel discovery, the
attorney-client privilege is considered absolute once the person
asserting the privilege satisfies the above five elements.86
Four issues may arise when a company attempts to assert the
attorney-cient privilege in order to protect third party audit
information. As noted, the company must establish that there was an
attorney-client relationship. In a company setting, the first issue will
likely be whether low level management employees or non-
management employees are considered the attorney's clients.
In Upjohn Co., the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that
limiting the attorney-client privilege to those who control or take a
substantial part in corporate decisions restricted the privilege too
severely. 87 In 1976, auditors alerted Upjohn to the possibility that.
certain of its subsidiaries were making improper payments to foreign
government officials. Based on this information, Upjohn's general
counsel launched an internal investigation.88 Corporate counsel sent
out confidential questionnaires and conducted interviews with mid-
level managers. 89  When the company voluntarily disclosed certain
questionable payments to the SEC, the Internal Revenue Service
issued a summons for the production of all documents gathered
during Upjohn's internal investigation.90
In holding that the questionnaires were privileged material, the
Court reasoned that "middle-level-and indeed lower level-
employees can ... have the relevant information needed by corporate
85. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding
that interviews of corporate employers by a law firm, retained by the corporation to investigate
and report on charges of corporate wrongdoing, were confidential communications of the
corporate client and entitled to the attorney-client privilege).
86. See id.
87. 449 U.S. at 392-93.
8& See id. at 386.
89. See id. at 387.
90. See id.
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counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such
actual or potential [legal] difficulties." 91  Without the vital facts
possessed by middle-level and lower level employees, the corporation
would be deprived of effective legal advice concerning "the vast and
complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting [it]. '"92
Without the protection of the attorney-client privilege, corporate
counsel would be faced with the choice of either interviewing middle-
level and lower level employees without the protection of the
attorney-client privilege or not interviewing such employees and
thereby giving advice with only a partial understanding of the facts. 93
There is no material difference between the type of internal
investigation conducted in Upjohn and a third party audit. An
occupational safety and health audit may involve questionnaires or
interviews with middle-level and lower level employees. 94  For
example, in order to assess a plant's compliance with OSHA's Hazard
Communication Standard, assembly line workers who handle
hazardous materials may be interviewed to ascertain whether they are
aware of the risks involved with handling the particular hazardous
material.95 Legal counsel cannot effectively counsel a corporation
without the ability to make an accurate compliance assessment of a
regulated plant. Accordingly, information obtained during a third
party audit from employees should fall within the attorney-client
privilege. 96
A second issue that arises when a company attempts to assert the
attorney-client privilege is whether the recipient of the information is
an attorney. This issue arises because the information collected
during a third party audit may be technical and will likely require an
occupational health and safety professional to act as an interpreter of
the information for the legal counsel. Some courts have found the
attorney-client privilege to exist in such circumstances if the non-
attorney is not conducting an independent investigation. 97
Courts should construe the attorney-client privilege to include
91. Id. at 391.
92. Id. at 392.
93. See id. at 391-92.
94. See generally AIHA Auditing Manual, supra note 44.
95. See OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(1) (1998).
96. Many of these issues are similar in an environmental auditing context. For a thorough
discussion of audits in that context, see Heather L. Cook & Robert R. Hearn, Putting Together
the Pieces: A Comprehensive Examination of the Legal and Policy Issues of Environmental
Auditing, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 545,566-73 (1994).
97. See id. at 569.
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third party audits completed with the assistance of non-attorneys.
Doing otherwise may result in an attorney acting on technically
incorrect information in order to maintain confidentiality. Such a
situation could potentially result in incorrect findings and conclusions,
thereby defeating the purpose of the audit.
The third issue involves whether the company was actually
seeking legal advice. Some courts have held that the involvement of
an attorney in an audit does not indicate that the company was
seeking legal advice by performing the audit.98 Other courts have
presumed that any attorney-client communication is evidence that
legal counsel is sought and therefore is protected by the attorney-
client privilege.99
Courts should presume that third party audits are performed for
the purpose of obtaining legal counsel for several reasons. First, this
presumption is warranted because an audit is generally performed to
determine whether a company is meeting its legal duties under the
OSH Act. Second, compliance with the numerous and complex
OSHA standards and the OSH Act's general duty clause does not
result from the application of common sense. For example, some
hazardous material regulated by OSHA standards have very complex
and proscriptive standards. Alternatively, a large majority of the
hazardous material regulated by OSHA standards only has limits that
address the maximum amount of the material that can be airborne. 100
Arguably, a company could use common sense to comply with one of
OSHA's proscriptive standards. However, a company may find it
difficult to comply with standards that are not proscriptive or with
OSHA's general duty clause. Compliance with non-proscriptive
OSHA standards or with OSHA's general duty clause would likely
involve the application of technical knowledge and knowledge of
other OSHA standards such as the OSHA standard for respiratory
protection. Finally, assuming that the attorney-client privilege
protects third party audit information, the privilege promotes the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege, that is the free flow of
information between an attorney and her corporate client.
When a company attempts to assert the attorney-client privilege
in order to protect third party audit information, a fourth issue
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See C.F.R. §§ 1910.1000 to .1025 (1998) (OSHA Z table standards to the OSHA
standard for lead or asbestos).
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involving confidentiality of the communication is implicated. There
are various ways to waive an attorney-client privilege. For instance, if
either the attorney or the company conveys the substance of the
confidential information to a non-privileged third party, the
confidential status of the communication may be lost.01 Additionally,
voluntary disclosure of material containing confidential information
to a third party waives the attorney-client privilege. 1 2 The attorney-
client privilege is also waived for the entire communication once any
part of the privileged communication is disclosed to a third party.1 03
Also, a company may implicitly waive the attorney-client privilege if
it discloses information to the government during an investigation or
enforcement action.1°4 However, some courts have held that the
disclosure of internal reports to a regulatory agency does not amount
to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 05
Courts should not allow the disclosure of third party audits to a
regulatory agency to waive the attorney-client privilege. A finding of
no privilege in such instances would have a chilling effect on OSHA's
relationship with companies, a relationship that is already viewed by
most companies as adversarial. However, other parties could likely
obtain the same information from non-privileged sources. A finding
of privilege in such instances would prevent the company's efforts
from being used freely by its adversaries. For example, a finding of
no privilege might allow a company's adversary to obtain information
about its noncompliance through a Freedom of Information Act
request and use that information to put the company in a bad public
light.1°6
c. The Work Product Doctrine Applied to Third Party Audits
The work product doctrine embodied in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure prevents material prepared in anticipation of
litigation from being discovered.1°7 Under the work product doctrine,
101. See Cook & Hearn, supra note 96, at 571.




106. See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 282 (1979) (striking down reverse Freedom of
Information Act suits).
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) reads in part:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
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information prepared in anticipation of litigation may be confidential
even for information requested by unions.10 8 There are four different
types of work product and each has a different degree of protection
from discovery. 1°9 The four types of work product are: facts, ordinary
work product, opinion work product, and legal theories. Facts
contained within a document classified as work product are not
protected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and therefore
may be discovered by deposition or interrogatory. 110 Legal theories
found within work product may also be discoverable through
interrogatories or requests for admissions."'
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) implicitly distinguishes
between ordinary and opinion work product. Ordinary work product
is considered material that does not contain the mental impressions of
the attorney.112 Conversely, opinion work product is material that
contains the "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning
the litigation.1" 3 Opinion work product receives a higher degree of
protection compared to ordinary work product." 4
A company must meet the following three elements in order for
third party audit material to receive protection from discovery under
the work product doctrine: (1) the material must consist of documents
or tangible things; (2) the material must be prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial; and (3) the material must be prepared by or for
another party."5 To determine whether the work product doctrine is
applicable, a court must first decide what category of work product
applies to the audit information. Categorizing the third party audit
information as opinion work product would be advantageous because
that category receives the highest degree of protection from
representative only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
108. See General Dynamics Corp., Quincy Shipbuilding Div., 28 NLRB 1432, 1433 (1984)
(study bearing on union's subcontracting grievances and pending litigation).
109. See Jeff A. Anderson et al., Special Project: The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 760, 788 (1983).
110. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3).
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b), 36(a).
112. See Anderson et al., supra note 109, at 793.
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
114. See Anderson et al., supra note 109, at 789; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Cook &
Hearn, supra note 96, at 574.
115. See Anderson et al., supra note 109, at 792.
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discovery.
The provision in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure strongly suggests that a court will likely categorize third
party audit information as opinion work product. This is because
determination of whether a company has violated a legal duty under
the OSH Act requires an attorney to state a legal opinion or come to
a conclusion based on applying the OSH Act or an OSHA standard
to the facts contained in the third party audit. For example, if an
attorney receives factual information during a third party audit
concerning a potential violation of the OSH Act or an OSHA
standard, the attorney will likely determine whether there is an
affirmative defense available. This analysis requires the attorney to
apply complex law to the facts and reach a conclusion.116 Accordingly,
such reports should be classified as opinion work product.
A second work product issue involves whether the work product
doctrine is applicable when the third party audit material was
prepared in anticipation of litigation. Most courts employ a fact-
specific inquiry to determine whether documents were prepared in
anticipation of litigation.117 A company asserting work product
immunity for third party audit information has the burden of showing
that the document was prepared in anticipation of litigation. Some
courts have protected environmental auditing material from
discovery under the work product doctrine when the material was
prepared prior to the inception of litigation.118 However, other courts
have not protected environmental auditing material from discovery
under the work product doctrine when the material was prepared
following an official warning of violation issued by a government
inspector.119 Additionally, courts apply the "in anticipation of
litigation" standard differently.120
Application of the work product doctrine to third party auditing
material is likely limited by the requirement that the material be
prepared in anticipation of litigation for several reasons. Many would
argue that a company conducting a third party audit is exercising a
form of management. Additionally, the facts contained in a third
party audit would be discoverable, as discussed above, and OSHA
116. See generally MARK A ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW
(West's Handbook Series, 3rd ed. 1990).
117. See Cook & Hearn, supra note 96, at 576 & n.197.
118. See id. at 577 & n.200.
119. See id. at 578 & n.205.
120. See id. at 577 & n.198.
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would most likely be interested in the facts contained in a third party
audit because of the implications for finding a more serious violation.
Despite the limitation imposed by the "in anticipation of
litigation" requirement, courts should extend immunity from
discovery to final reports prepared following a third party audit. The
underlying facts of a third party audit would remain available through
discovery. The goal of the third party audit is that a company with no
previous compliance assessment should obtain such an assessment
from a qualified professional. A company in such a position could
plausibly argue that the third party audit is likely to uncover
violations and therefore the third party audit is also performed in
anticipation of regulatory action.
d. The Self-Evaluation Privilege Applied to Third Party Audits
A privilege of self-critical analysis has developed in several
contexts to shield self-evaluations from discovery. 21 Several aspects
of the privilege are worth noting before discussing the elements of the
privilege and its application to third party audits. Unlike the
privileges discussed above, the privilege of self-critical analysis has
been the subject of state legislation.12   Also, the common law
governing the privilege of self-critical analysis varies among the
states. 123 Finally, the privilege is likely to be applied inconsistently
because it has been formulated almost exclusively at the trial court
level. 124 Trial court decisions are not reported and therefore there is
no opportunity to understand how a trial court judge applies the
privilege. Thus, different trial judges will likely apply the privilege
differently.
There are three types of documents to which the privilege of self-
critical analysis has been applied: minutes of hospital committee
meetings, reports of internal disciplinary investigations, and Title VII
compliance documents. 125  However, the privilege should be
applicable to any document that meets the elements discussed below.
There are three elements that must be met in order to have a
self-critical analysis shielded from discovery. 26 First, the information
121. See Note, supra note 68 for an in-depth review of the privilege of self-critical analysis.
122. See id. at 1084 & n.ll.
123. See id. at 1085-86 & n.13.
124. See id. at 1085 & n.12.
125. See id. at 1083.
126. See id. at 1086.
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must result from a critical self-analysis undertaken by the party
seeking protection. Second, the public must have a strong interest in
preserving the free flow of the information that is sought in discovery.
Finally, the information must be of such a nature that its development
would be limited or stopped if discovery of the information were
allowed. However, some courts have not recognized the privilege
when the government has sought discovery.127 This limitation has
particular relevance to third party audit information should OSHA
request discovery of the information during a subsequent
investigation. This limitation defeated the privilege in the only
environmental auditing case to date. 128 However, not applying the
self-evaluation privilege to third party audits would defeat the self-
policing purpose of a third party audit. "[T]he question is not
whether the self-evaluative privilege impedes the government's
enforcement ability; it is whether an overriding public interest in
keeping certain information confidential justifies that imposition. ' 129
The statement of the self-critical analysis privilege was put forth
in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.130  The Bredice court
acknowledged the self-defeating nature of allowing discovery of audit
information. Many courts have approved the Bredice court's
rationale.13 Courts should apply the principles articulated in Bredice
to third party audits. Companies who undertake audits are using a
critical self-analysis process and are seeking to improve the safety and
health of their workplace. There is a strong public interest in
preserving the free flow of information during an audit, namely
preventing injury and illness. As discussed earlier, some employers
may stop performing audits because of the risks involved when
discovery of the information is allowed.
The extent of the public interest in self-critical analyses and the
type of information the privilege protects has not been fully
delineated because the privilege is at an early stage of development.132
Despite the uncertainty these factors provide in the application of the
127. See Cook & Hearn, supra note 96, at 579 & n.217 (citing Federal Trade Comm'n v.
TRW, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 160, 162-63 (D. D.C. 1979) (holding with no explanation that the
privilege is not enforceable against the government)).
128. See Cook & Hearn, supra note 96, at 580 (citing United States v. Dexter, 132 F.R.D. 8
(D. Conn. 1990) (discovery of environmental auditing materials in a Clean Water Act civil
enforcement action upheld pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)).
129. Cook & Hearn, supra note 96, at 581.
130. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
131. See Note, supra note 68, at 1087 & n.18.
132. See id.
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self-evaluation privilege, the privilege has applicability to third party
audits because third party audits are performed for self-evaluation
purposes and the OSH Act is couched in terms of a public health
benefit.
One of the principles articulated by courts as a rationale for the
privilege is the chilling effect of disclosure on self-critical analyses. 33
This effect operates to discourage a company from conducting a third
party audit at all, or from conducting a thorough audit. Fear of
lawsuits or regulatory action is a primary cause for a company to
hesitate or refrain from conducting an audit. Additionally, there are
disincentives for an employee to be frank with information that may
be disclosed. Coming forward with information may subject the
employee to disciplinary action, the wrath of co-workers, and may
concern the employee that she is exposing her employer to liability.
A second principle that should be considered by courts as a
rationale for the privilege is the effect of verifiability and replicability
on a company's decision to perform a third party audit. "An
unreplicable damning report that is verifiable is not likely to be
produced if it can be discovered, because production will provide the
only means possible for [others] to obtain and analyze the
information that would go into such a report.113 4  Similarly, a
company is not likely to conduct a third party audit if OSHA is able
to discover such information and OSHA is not able to obtain the
information otherwise.
Courts should not hesitate to apply the self-evaluation privilege
to third party audits when the three criteria discussed above are met.
Only through such a development will the goals of a third party audit,
improved safety and health in our nation's workplaces, be met and
the purpose of the privilege be achieved.
2. The Unionized Workplace and the Right to Audit Information
When a union represents employees, employer information
about workplace safety and health must be disclosed upon request to
the union.'35 Without this requirement the union would be unable to
perform its statutory duties as bargaining agent for the employees-
133. See id. at 1091.
134. See id. at 1095.
135. See NLRB v. American Nat'l Can Co., Foster-Forbes Glass Div., 924 F.2d 518, 524 (4th
Cir. 1991).
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these duties include securing a safe and healthy workplace. 3 6 The
National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB") and courts have
adopted a liberal discovery-type standard, which requires that the
information be directly related to the union's function as bargaining
representative, and that it appears reasonably necessary for the
performance of that function.
131
One consideration in determining relevancy and necessity is the
union's need for the information.18 When a request has become
moot because of subsequent events, the employer does not have a
statutory obligation to furnish the requested information because the
request does not have relevancy. 139 Thus, employers who promptly
correct deficiencies identified by an audit may not have a duty to
disclose the audit information. In addition, an employer can attach
conditions to providing third party audit information, provided that
the conditions are reasonably related to the employer's interest in
preventing disclosure to others.140  Moreover, the NLRB has taken
the position that an employer is entitled to bargain with a union to
resolve confidentiality concerns. An employer is "entitled to discuss
confidentiality concerns regarding the information request with the
[u]nion so as to try to develop mutually agreeable protective
conditions for its disclosure to the [u]nion" when the employer has
legitimate concerns regarding the confidentiality of the information
sought by the union.14'
The parties must bargain in good faith to reach an
accommodation of interests. If the parties cannot resolve the matter
through bargaining, the NLRB will balance the parties' competing
interests. 42 The employer who asserts confidentiality has the burden
136. See generally Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 261 NLRB 27 (1982), enforced sub nom.
Oil Workers Local 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
137. See generally J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Item Co.,
220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955).
138. See generally NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (holding that when both the
union and the company treat a claim by either party as highly relevant to reaching an
agreement, the claim must be substantiated to support a finding of bargaining in good faith).
139. See generally Glazers Wholesale Drug Co., 211 NLRB 1063 (1974) (company's refusal
to supply union with names of replacement workers became moot when strikers returned to
work).
140. See generally Fruit & Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen Local 760 v. NLRB
(Yakima Frozen Foods), 316 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (an employer may attach conditions to
the furnishing of financial information that are reasonably related to its own business interest);
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 981 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1992) (an employer may
condition disclosure of financial data on the union's willingness to keep the data confidential).
141. Silver Brothers Co. Inc., 312 NLRB 1060, 1062 (1993).
142. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 309-11 (1979).
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of proof143 and "has a duty to seek an accommodation.' 1 44 "[T]he
employer must bargain toward an accommodation between the
union's information needs and the employer's justified interests. ' 145
Recently, the NLRB required an employer to provide a complete
copy of the environmental audit of its facilities. 146  The NLRB
rejected the employer's confidentiality claim because the employer
had failed to timely raise the issue, the audit was not prepared in
anticipation of litigation, and the audit was not an internal, self-
critical report. 147 The NLRB found the audit was not confidential
because it did not contain speculative material or criticisms of persons
or events.148  This decision demonstrates that the NLRB did not
balance the union's need for the information against any legitimate
and substantial confidentiality interests of the employer. Instead, the
NLRB contrasted the facts of the case-a routine, annual audit made
without union participation-with a previous case where an
investigation was conducted with union participation following a
serious accident. 149 In distinguishing the two cases, the NLRB gave
importance to two criteria: (1) whether the union participated in the
audit or investigation and (2) whether the audit was prepared
following a serious accident and in anticipation of litigation.
The dissent in Detroit Newspaper Agency had a more rationale
approach. Specifically, the dissent would have required the employer
to (1) turn over to the union portions of the audit relating to
workplace conditions, except for judgments of management's
performance and other similar statements and (2) bargain with the
union over a procedure for protecting the confidentiality of judgment
statements and recommendations in an audit. 150
Accordingly, an employer whose employees are represented by a
union could take advantage of a federal statutory privilege for a third
party audits and not run afoul of its duties under the National Labor
Relations Act (the "NLRA") if certain steps are taken. Specifically,
the employer should bargain with the union and agree to a procedure
concerning obtaining the audit. In addition, the employer and the
143. See generally United States Postal Service (Main Post Office), 289 NLRB 942 (1988).
144. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., 301 NLRB 1104, 1105 (1991).
145. Id. at 1106.
146. See generally Detroit Newspaper Agency, 317 NLRB 1071 (1995).
147. See id. at 1073.
148. See id. at 1074.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1074-75.
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union should agree to provisions for confidentiality of the employer's
judgments, statements, and recommendations. An employer should
not only invite the union to participate in an audit, but also make the
records reviewed for the audit available to the union. When actually
drafting the audit report, the employer must ensure that it has control
over the tone and substance of the document. Finally, whether the
audit was routine or prepared following an accident should be a moot
point with respect to liability under the NLRA if the union and
employer have agreed beforehand about the procedures for an audit.
III. THE CREATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTORY PRIVILEGE FOR
THIRD PARTY AUDITS
The current Senate version of the OSH Act provides a federal
statutory privilege for third party audits.'51 Any records relating to a
third party audit would not be admissible in a court of law or
administrative proceeding, except to show fraud or malfeasance of a
certified auditor.15 2 Several aspects of the proposed federal statutory
privilege are worth noting. First, the proposed federal statutory
privilege would not require the involvement of an attorney to provide
the protection of the privilege. Second, the privilege would not
protect records required to be collected under the OSH Act. Third,
the privilege is worded so as to provide protection for third party
audits or "records, reports, or other information prepared in
connection with safety and health inspections, audits, or reviews
conducted by... an employer."'53 This language appears to broaden
the protection of the privilege to include not only third party audits,
but also audits conducted by the employer. This aspect of the current
Senate version has not been the subject of discussion in the
occupational safety and health press and professional circles but will
likely be discussed during congressional floor debate. Finally, the
privilege would not protect material collected for fraudulent purposes
or in instances of auditor malfeasance. Some states have passed a
statutory privilege for environmental auditing material similar to the
151. See S. 1237 § 5(e).
152. See id. The provision reads:
Any records relating to [a third party audit] provided by an individual qualified under
the program, or records, reports, or other information prepared in connection with
safety and health inspections, audits, or reviews conducted by or for an employer and
not required under this Act, shall not be admissible in a court of law or administrative
proceeding against the employer except that such records may be used as evidence for
purposes of a disciplinary action [against a certified auditor].
153. Id.
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one proposed for OSHA reform. 154
The proposed federal statutory privilege would have several
positive effects. First, and most importantly, it would eliminate the
uncertainty associated with the common law privilege. As a result,
companies would be encouraged to perform audits because of a
greater sense of predictability concerning the discoverability of audit
information. Second, it would further OSHA's position of
encouraging voluntary safety and health audits.155 Third, conducting
an audit to ascertain compliance with the OSH Act would be more
economically attractive to employers because the legal services and
resulting attorney's fees would not be required.
Despite the perceived advantages of a federal statutory privilege
for occupational safety and health audits, several questions arise.
What would be the procedural requirements for either asserting or
contesting the privilege? Who would have the burden of proving that
the audit was prepared for fraudulent purposes, as this information
will likely reside with the employer? What must the federal
government show when it is seeking to obtain audit information,
probable cause or a lesser standard? In light of the large amount of
debate surrounding the OSH Act, it is interesting to note that the
above questions have not been raised or discussed.
In addition to these procedural questions, other questions arise
concerning the standardization of auditing requirements and
procedures. As mentioned previously, the current Senate version of
the OSH Act provides that an independent, nonpartisan advisory
committee would be charged with making recommendations to the
Secretary of Labor with respect to the third party auditors and
evaluations.156 Although several groups have established guidelines
for occupational safety and health audits, there is not a national
consensus standard that addresses occupational safety and health
audits.1 57 The lack of a national consensus standard may make the
task of setting a standard for third party audits difficult. For example,
what elements will be necessary for the audit? Will a set of systematic
plans that provide guidance in the preparation, fieldwork, and
154. See Cook & Hearn, supra note 96, at 582.
155. See Yohay, supra note 38, at 663.
156. See S. 1237 § 4.
157. See, e.g., AIHA Auditing Manual, supra note 44; ARTHUR D. LITTLE,
ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY AUDITOR'S FIELD GUIDE: KEY TECHNIQUES FOR
CONDUCTING AUDITS, (3rd ed. 1991); ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING ROUNDTABLE,
STANDARDS FOR PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY AUDITS (1993).
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reporting be required? What, if any, quality checks will be required
in order to assure accurate results? What documentation will be
required? Similar to the questions concerning procedural matters,
there has not been discussion about the need for standardization of
audits or the means to assure standardization if standardization is
required.
The suggestions that follow are an attempt to stimulate dialogue
and debate on these questions. Occupational health and safety
professionals must begin to anticipate and evaluate different
suggestions to these questions because of the potential impact on
their professions and the impact any change will have on occupational
health and safety programs.
A. Procedural Requirements for Asserting or Contesting the Privilege
Under the current Senate version of OSHA reform, a third party
audit would be privileged in civil, criminal, and administrative
proceedings. Discovering parties could overcome the privilege only
upon a showing that (1) the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent
purpose; (2) the audit contains evidence relevant to show the
malfeasance or gross negligence of a certified auditor; or (3) the audit
contains evidence relevant to show the third party auditor does not
meet the requirements of the program. 58 However, the current
Senate version of OSHA reform does not provide language that
details the procedural requirements for asserting or contesting the
privilege. Because there are no guidelines and the bill has not been
debated, the procedural requirements are left to presumption. The
following discussion provides a suggestion for what the procedural
requirements should be for a privilege for third party audits.
The procedural requirements for asserting or contesting the
privilege would necessarily be somewhat complex. First, a party
seeking disclosure of the audit should have the burden of proving that
the audit was prepared for fraudulent purposes. In other words, the
audit would be presumed to be non-fraudulent unless the party
seeking disclosure could point to indicia of fraud. This presumption is
consistent with the current Senate version of OSHA reform.1
59
Additionally, absent this presumption, companies would be in the
158. See S. 1237 § 5.
159. See id. (stating that any records relating to a third party audit would not be admissible
in a court of law or administrative proceeding except to show fraud or malfeasance of a certified
auditor.)
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same position they are in today without the privilege, (i.e., using
complicated legal maneuvering to protect audit information from
discovery). However, once the presumption is rebutted, the burden
would fall on a company to show that the audit was conducted to
assess its compliance under the OSH Act. Without a presumption
that could be rebutted, a company could use the privilege for
purposes other than assessing its compliance with the OSH Act.
Also, the burden should be on the company because information
showing that the audit was conducted to assess its compliance with
the OSH Act is most likely to be in the company's possession.
If the audit is sought in a criminal proceeding, the government
should be able to obtain the information under a criminal search
warrant, by subpoena, or through regular discovery channels upon a
showing of probable cause. Upon attaining the audit, the government
should be required to place it under seal without review or disclosure
of the contents. The employer responsible for the audit would be
able to assert the privilege-within a limited time frame of the
government obtaining the audit-by petitioning the court for an in
camera hearing to determine the applicability of the statute.
This approach would increase efficiency in two distinct ways.
First, instead of arguing whether an audit should be privileged, legal
arguments would focus on whether the audit was fraudulent or
performed to assist a company to assess its compliance with the OSH
Act. Second, pretrial motion hearings would be replaced with a
simple in camera review.
B. Standardization of Auditing Requirements and Procedures
The current trend in auditing is assessing program effectiveness,
not compliance auditing. Recently, there has been increased
attention to the development of management systems for
occupational health and safety programs. 16° Numerous governmental
and non-governmental bodies throughout the world are either in the
process of developing occupational health and safety management
systems ("OHSMS") or are considering such development.161 OSHA
160. See generally NEW FRONTIERS IN OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY: A
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM APPROACH AND THE ISO MODEL (Charles F. Redinger & Steven P.
Levine eds., 1996).
161. See generally Charles F. Redinger & Steven P. Levine, Development and Evaluation of
the Michigan Occupational Health and Safety Management System Assessment Instrument: A
Universal OHSMS Performance Measurement Tool, AM. IND. HYGIENE ASSOC. J., Aug. 1998,
at 573.
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has initiated rulemaking for a comprehensive occupational health and
safety program standard. 162 In addition, OSHA is field testing a
Program Evaluation Profile ("PEP") that analyzes employer
programs based on fifteen factors. 163 Some of the fifteen factors
include: comprehensive work-site survey and hazard analysis, regular
site inspections, employee hazard reporting system and response,
accident and "near-miss" investigations, and injury and illness data
analysis. Other assessment instruments have proposed different
measurement criteria.164 Because of the trend towards development
of OHSMS and the tools to assess them, it is more likely that an
instrument such as the PEP would be developed for use by third party
auditors.
As third party audits will apply to large or small workplaces and
high-risk or low-risk workplaces, it will be imperative that the
instrument developed be flexible. Also of paramount importance will
be the need for the instrument to have a high degree of validity and
reliability and a means of incorporating subjective differences
between individual third party auditors. A valid and reliable
instrument that measured program effectiveness would negate the
criticism that a third party audit should not replace an OSHA
inspection. The activities underway and described above will provide
valuable empirical information for policy discussions by OSHA and
its advisory committee should OSHA reform become a reality in the
future.
C. Auditor Qualifications
Finally, questions also arise concerning the qualifications and
qualities of an auditor. As discussed previously, the current Senate
version of OSHA reform spells out the minimum qualifications for a
third party auditor. 165  These qualifications are based primarily on
whether the individual has an appropriate professional background
and is either licensed by a state or certified through a nationally
162. See generally Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor
Occupational Safety and Health Administration to its Stakeholders (Nov. 15, 1996) (on file with
author).
163. See generally Joseph Dear, Voluntary Safety and Health Audits under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (visited Sept. 18, 1998) <http://www.osha-slc.gov/OshDoc?Interp-data/
119960911.html>.
164. See, e.g., AIHA Auditing Manual, supra note 44.
165. See S. 1237 § 5.
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recognized private accreditation organization. 166  However, state
licensing and certification in an occupational safety or health field
does not necessarily demonstrate proficiency for conducting audits.
Critics may argue that the professional associations representing
these professionals are lobbying for third party audits as a means of
securing employment for their members and therefore additional
regulation is required. 67  Others would counter that having the
requisite professional background and the threat of liability for
injuries resulting from negligent audits are sufficient means for
maintaining auditing proficiency.168  Additionally, any enhanced
employment opportunities for selected professionals should not be a
reason to defeat a program that could provide a public benefit in the
form of increased awareness within companies of their occupational
safety and health problems.
CONCLUSION
In sum, a federal statutory privilege for occupational safety and
health audits would have several advantages compared to common
law privileges, primarily by providing more consistency than is
provided through the common law. Moreover, such a privilege would
also promote public health by encouraging companies to conduct
audits. In so doing, businesses would become increasingly aware of
the occupational safety and health problems in their workplaces. The
current Senate version of OSHA reform raises several procedural
questions about such a privilege in addition to questions concerning
standardization of audits and auditor qualifications. These issues can
be overcome by the suggestions made in this article. First, the audit
should be presumed to be non-fraudulent unless the party seeking
disclosure can point to some indication of fraud. The burden would
then shift and fall on the employer to show the audit was conducted
to assess its compliance with the OSH Act. Second, in a criminal
proceeding the government should be able to obtain the audit
information upon a showing of probable cause. However, the
employer should be able to assert the privilege by petitioning the
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Letter from the American Association of Occupational Health Nurses,
American College of Occupation and Environmental Medicine, American Industrial Hygiene
Association, American Society of Safety Engineers, and the National Society of Professional
Engineers to the Members of Congress (Feb. 23, 1996) (on file with author).
168. See, e.g., MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 508
(3rd ed. 1990).
[Vol. 75:195
1999] OSHA REFORM: AN EXAMINATION OF THIRD PARTY AUDITS 227
court for an in camera hearing to determine the applicability of the
statute. Questions concerning standardization of audits will likely be
answered by activities currently underway to develop valid and
reliable audit instruments. Finally, concerns about auditors'
qualifications are addressed by the requirement that auditors have
certain professional qualifications and the ability to bring tort actions
for a negligently conducted audit. Both of these factors assist
securing third party audits that are conducted in a competent manner.
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